Yuan’s global popularity keeps rising

 

Growing acceptance: A bank employee counting 100-yuan notes in Nantong, China’s eastern Jiangsu province. Usage of the currency has jumped in the past three months as international funds boosted holdings of Chinese government bonds. — AFP
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BEIJING: The Chinese yuan is making deeper inroads as a currency of choice for global payments, with international transactions climbing to their highest level ever.
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Payments using the currency jumped to a record 3.2% of market share, according to data from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications, breaking through its previous high set in 2015 that came on the back of a currency devaluation in a bid to increase exports.
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Usage has jumped in the past three months as international funds boosted holdings of Chinese government bonds, pushing their share to a fresh record, and amid gas producer Gazprom Neft’s decision to accept yuan rather than dollars for fuelling the Russian airplanes at China’s airports.
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The People’s Bank of China governor Yi Gang urged emerging economies to promote the use of local currencies at a Group-of-20 central banks’ gathering Wednesday, echoing a similar call from Indonesia to reduce reliance on the dollar to manage the risk of Federal Reserve’s stimulus withdrawal.
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The yuan will be one of the biggest beneficiaries as “trade between various Asian countries and China grows, and more of it is denominated in yuan,” said Alvin T. Tan, head of Asia FX strategy at Royal Bank of Canada in Hong Kong.
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Yuan’s growing popularity could also provide additional support for assets denominated in the currency, even as China’s yield premium over the United States narrows due to policy divergence between the two nations. She expects the yuan to be assigned a larger share in the International Monetary Fund’s reevaluation of Special Drawing Rights basket in July.
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The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership trade deal that deepens China’s regional foreign trade ties will also prompt member nations to raise yuan asset holdings due to further economic integration with China, she wrote in a note Wednesday.
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The currency retained its fourth place in the past two months, compared with being the 35th most-popular medium of exchange for payments in October 2010 when Swift, which handles cross-border payment messages for more than 11,000 financial institutions in 200 countries, started tracking.
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Despite its rise in the rankings and having upped its market share by orders of magnitude over the last 12 years, the yuan is still dwarfed in popularity by its more established peers, notably the US dollar and the euro.
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The dollar kept its top spot in January, a position it’s held since June, even though its market share fell to about 39.9% from 40.5% in December.
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The euro also lost ground but held onto second place, while the British pound and yen rounded out the top five in third and fifth place, respectively. — Bloomberg

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China, France deepen RMB Cross-Border Interbank Payment System cooperation

The cooperation between China and France on the RMB Cross-Border Interbank Payment System will help with internationalization of the yuan and will also provide an opportunity for the eurozone to reduce its reliance on the US dollar, experts said.

 

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Yuan’s rising global influence 

 

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Yuan’s rising global influence

 

The currency’s correlation with an MSCI Inc index of its developing-nation peers rose to record in September on a weekly basis before edging back slightly amid the Omicron outbreak, Bloomberg data show.

` BEIJING: The Chinese yuan is having a greater impact on its emerging-market counterparts than ever before and may play a crucial role in determining their performance in the coming year.

` The currency’s correlation with an MSCI Inc index of its developing-nation peers rose to record in September on a weekly basis before edging back slightly amid the Omicron outbreak, Bloomberg data show.

` While the close relationship is partly a result of China’s large weighting, it’s also been driven by the yuan’s links to the Brazilian real reaching the strongest since at least 2008, and that with India’s rupee touching a three-year high.The yuan’s rising global influence is yet another sign of China’s deepening connections across the world economy.

` Investors are increasingly being drawn to its bonds as an alternative to United States Treasuries, while some banks are calling for the yuan to join the dollar, euro and yen as a global reserve currency.

` ADVERTISING Yet with China’s potential being offset by murky policy making and regulatory crackdowns, being tied too closely to the yuan may also backfire.

` “China is going to be a very important element of emerging-market stability and the growth picture,” said Magdalena Polan, principal economist at PGIM Ltd in London.

` “The willingness for Chinese policy makers to stabilise growth will be very important to the outlook for Latam and Asia and South Africa, as countries there still rely quite a lot on exports from China.”

` While correlations can be measured in many ways, China’s increasing presence in global trade has progressively boosted the yuan’s links with those of its emerging-market peers.

` In 2000, the average developing nation sent only 2.2% of its exports to China, while that proportion has now grown to 11.3%, according to data from Societe Generale SA.

` The investment bank says the yuan’s relative stability has traditionally made it most closely correlated with those of its emerging-market peers with strong and credible policy makers such as Mexico, Chile and South Korea.

` Since the US-China trade war in 2018, however, the yuan’s links with emerging markets as a whole have grown stronger, with the average correlation rising to 83% that year, according to SocGen data.

` There’s a risk of course that those very connections may also weigh on emerging-market currencies if the yuan begins to weaken. The major risk of that happening looks to be due to potential policy divergence, with the People’s Bank of China expected to ease monetary policy in 2022, just as central banks from the US, UK and Australia start to tighten.

` The yuan will face a particular challenge as the Federal Reserve beings to raise borrowing costs, a move that is anticipated to lead to a stronger dollar and outflows from emergin

`g markets. Still, China’s currency has so far shown itself to be relatively resilient to monetary policy at home and abroad. China’s economy has become an increasingly important influence on global growth over the past decade, and a vital one for emerging markets, according to JP Morgan Private Bank.

` “Since the financial crisis, we’ve had mini cycles in global emerging markets, largely coincident in China’s property and credit cycle and since the crisis that has been the key driver of the outlook in emerging markets for the most part,” said Alexander Wolf, head of investment strategy, Asia, at JP Morgan Private Bank in Hong Kong.

` The yuan’s relative resilience this year has also played a role in limiting fluctuations across emerging markets, in what has otherwise been a very tumultuous 12 months.

` “The fact that the yuan’s not doing too much I categorise it as a volatility suppressant,” said Paul Mackel, head of global foreign-exchange research at HSBC Holdings Plc in Hong Kong. “We believe that stability can last for longer.” — Bloomberg 

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When Will the U.S. Dollar Collapse?

https://youtu.be/N8IyDSrMY3w

By Kimberly Amadeo

Updated October 28, 2018

A dollar collapse is when the value of the U.S. dollar plummets. Anyone who holds dollar-denominated assets will sell them at any cost. That includes foreign governments who own U.S. Treasurys. It also affects foreign exchange futures traders. Last but not least are individual investors.

When the crash occurs, these parties will demand assets denominated in anything other than dollars. The collapse of the dollar means that everyone is trying to sell their dollar-denominated assets, and no one wants to buy them. This will drive the value of the dollar down to near zero. It makes hyperinflation look like a day in the park.

Two Conditions That Could Lead to the Dollar Collapse

Two conditions must be in place before the dollar could collapse. First, there must be an underlying weakness. As of 2017, the U.S. currency was fundamentally weak despite its 25 percent increase since 2014. The dollar declined 54.7 percent against the euro between 2002 and 2012. Why? The U.S. debt almost tripled during that period, from $6 trillion to $15 trillion. The debt is even worse now, at $21 trillion, making the debt-to-GDP ratio more than 100 percent. That increases the chance the United States will let the dollar's value slide as it would be easier to repay its debt with cheaper money.

Second, there must be a viable currency alternative for everyone to buy. The dollar's strength is based on its use as the world's reserve currency. The dollar became the reserve currency in 1973 when President Nixon abandoned the gold standard. As a global currency, the dollar is used for 43 percent of all cross-border transactions. That means central banks must hold the dollar in their reserves to pay for these transactions. As a result, 61 percent of these foreign currency reserves are in dollars.

Note:  The next most popular currency after the dollar is the euro. But it comprises less than 30 percent of central bank reserves. The eurozone debt crisis weakened the euro as a viable global currency.

China and others argue that a new currency should be created and used as the global currency. China's central banker Zhou Xiaochuan goes one step further. He claims that the yuan should replace the dollar to maintain China's economic growth. China is right to be alarmed at the dollar's drop in value. That's because it is the largest foreign holder of U.S. Treasury, so it just saw its investment deteriorate. The dollar's weakness makes it more difficult for China to control the yuan's value compared to the dollar.

Could bitcoin replace the dollar as the new world currency? It has many benefits. It's not controlled by any one country's central bank. It is created, managed, and spent online. It can also be used at brick-and-mortar stores that accept it. Its supply is finite. That appeals to those who would rather have a currency that's backed by something concrete, such as gold.

But there are big obstacles. First, its value is highly volatile. That's because there is no central bank to manage it. Second, it has become the coin of choice for illegal activities that lurk in the deep web. That makes it vulnerable to tampering by unknown forces.

Economic Event to Trigger the Collapse

These two situations make a collapse possible. But, it won’t occur without a third condition. That's a huge economic triggering event that destroys confidence in the dollar.

Altogether, foreign countries own more than $5 trillion in U.S. debt. If China, Japan or other major holders started dumping these holdings of Treasury notes on the secondary market, this could cause a panic leading to collapse. China owns $1 trillion in U.S. Treasury. That's because China pegs the yuan to the dollar. This keeps the prices of its exports to the United States relatively cheap. Japan also owns more than $1 trillion in Treasurys. It also wants to keep the yen low to stimulate exports to the United States.

Japan is trying to move out of a 15-year deflationary cycle. The 2011 earthquake and nuclear disaster didn't help.

Would China and Japan ever dump their dollars? Only if they saw their holdings declining in value too fast and they had another export market to replace the United States. The economies of Japan and China are dependent on U.S. consumers. They know that if they sell their dollars, that would further depress the value of the dollar. That means their products, still priced in yuan and yen, will cost relatively more in the United States. Their economies would suffer. Right now, it's still in their best interest to hold onto their dollar reserves.

Note: China and Japan are aware of their vulnerability. They are selling more to other Asian countries that are gradually becoming wealthier. But the United States is still the best market (not now) in the world.

When Will the Dollar Collapse?

It's unlikely that it will collapse at all. That's because any of the countries who have the power to make that happen (China, Japan, and other foreign dollar holders) don't want it to occur. It's not in their best interest. Why bankrupt your best customer? Instead, the dollar will resume its gradual decline as these countries find other markets.

Effects of the Dollar Collapse

A sudden dollar collapse would create global economic turmoil. Investors would rush to other currencies, such as the euro, or other assets, such as gold and commodities. Demand for Treasurys would plummet, and interest rates would rise. U.S. import prices would skyrocket, causing inflation.

U.S. exports would be dirt cheap, given the economy a brief boost. In the long run, inflation, high interest rates, and volatility would strangle possible business growth. Unemployment would worsen, sending the United States back into recession or even a depression.

How to Protect Yourself

Protect yourself from a dollar collapse by first defending yourself from a gradual dollar decline.

Important:  Keep your assets well-diversified by holding foreign mutual funds, gold, and other commodities.

A dollar collapse would create global economic turmoil. To respond to this kind of uncertainty, you must be mobile. Keep your assets liquid, so you can shift them as needed. Make sure your job skills are transferable. Update your passport, in case things get so bad for so long that you need to move quickly to another country. These are just a few ways to protect yourself and survive a dollar collapse.

US Trade Deficit With China and Why It's So High

The Real Reason American Jobs Are Going to China 

By Kimberly Amadeo 

Updated November 21, 2018

The U.S. trade deficit with China was $375 billion in 2017. The trade deficit exists because U.S. exports to China were only $130 billion while imports from China were $506 billion.

The United States imported from China $77 billion in computers and accessories, $70 billion in cell phones, and $54 billion in apparel and footwear. A lot of these imports are from U.S. manufacturers that send raw materials to China for low-cost assembly. Once shipped back to the United States, they are considered imports.

In 2017, China imported from America $16 billion in commercial aircraft, $12 billion in soybeans, and $10 billion in autos. In 2018, China canceled its soybean imports after President Trump started a trade war. He imposed tariffs on Chinese steel exports and other goods. 

Current Trade Deficit

As of July 2018, the United States exported a total of $74.3 billion in goods to China. It imported $296.8 billion, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. As a result, the total trade deficit with China is $222.6 billion. A monthly breakdown is in the chart.

Monthly U.S. Trade Deficit With China From January to July 2018

NOTE: All figures are in millions of US$

Exports Imports Balance

US$211.1

Jul 18

US$202

Jan 18

US$205

Feb 18

US$210

Mar 18

US$210

Apr 18

US$214

May 18

US$213

Jun 18

US$211

Jul 18

Chart: The Balance Source: United States Census Bureau

Causes

China can produce many consumer goods at lower costs than other countries can. Americans, of course, want these goods for the lowest prices. How does China keep prices so low? Most economists agree that China's competitive pricing is a result of two factors:

1. A lower standard of living, which allows companies in China to pay lower wages to workers.
2. An exchange rate that is partially fixed to the dollar.

If the United States implemented trade protectionism, U.S. consumers would have to pay high prices for their "Made in America" goods. It’s unlikely that the trade deficit will change. Most people would rather pay as little as possible for computers, electronics, and clothing, even if it means other Americans lose their jobs.

China is the world's largest economy. It also has the world's biggest population. It must divide its production between almost 1.4 billion residents. A common way to measure standard of living is gross domestic product per capita. In 2017, China’s GDP per capita was $16,600. China's leaders are desperately trying to get the economy to grow faster to raise the country’s living standards. They remember Mao's Cultural Revolution all too well. They know that the Chinese people won't accept a lower standard of living forever.

China sets the value of its currency, the yuan, to equal the value of a basket of currencies that includes the dollar. In other words, China pegs its currency to the dollar using a modified fixed exchange rate. When the dollar loses value, China buys dollars through U.S. Treasurys to support it. In 2016, China began relaxing its peg. It wants market forces to have a greater impact on the yuan's value. As a result, the dollar to yuan conversion has been more volatile since then. China's influence on the dollar remains substantial.

Effect

China must buy so many U.S. Treasury notes that it is the largest lender to the U.S. government. Japan is the second largest. As of September 2018, the U.S. debt to China was $1.15 trillion. That's 18 percent of the total public debt owned by foreign countries.

Many are concerned that this gives China political leverage over U.S. fiscal policy. They worry about what would happen if China started selling its Treasury holdings. It would also be disastrous if China merely cut back on its Treasury purchases.

Why are they so worried? By buying Treasurys, China helped keep U.S. interest rates low. If China were to stop buying Treasurys, interest rates would rise. That could throw the United States into a recession. But this wouldn’t be in China's best interests, as U.S. shoppers would buy fewer Chinese exports. In fact, China is buying almost as many Treasurys as ever.

U.S. companies that can't compete with cheap Chinese goods must either lower their costs or go out of business. Many businesses reduce their costs by outsourcing jobs to China or India. Outsourcing adds to U.S. unemployment. Other industries have just dried up. U.S. manufacturing, as measured by the number of jobs, declined 34 percent between 1998 and 2010. As these industries declined, so has U.S. competitiveness in the global marketplace
.

What's Being Done

President Trump promised to lower the trade deficit with China. On March 1, 2018, he announced he would impose a 25 percent tariff on steel imports and a 10 percent tariff on aluminum. On July 6, Trump's tariffs went into effect for $34 billion of Chinese imports. China canceled all import contracts for soybeans.

Trump's tariffs have raised the costs of imported steel, most of which is from China. Trump's move comes a month after he imposed tariffs and quotas on imported solar panels and washing machines. China has become a global leader in solar panel production. The tariffs depressed the stock market when they were announced.

The Trump administration is developing further anti-China protectionist measures, including more tariffs. It wants China to remove requirements that U.S. companies transfer technology to Chinese firms. China requires companies to do this to gain access to its market.

Trump also asked China to do more to raise its currency. He claims that China artificially undervalues the yuan by 15 percent to 40 percent. That was true in 2000. But former Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson initiated the U.S.-China Strategic Economic Dialogue in 2006. He convinced the People's Bank of China to strengthen the yuan's value against the dollar. It increased 2 to 3 percent annually between 2000 and 2013. U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew continued the dialogue during the Obama administration.

The Trump administration continued the talks until they stalled in July 2018.

The dollar strengthened 25 percent between 2013 and 2015. It took the Chinese yuan up with it. China had to lower costs even more to compete with Southeast Asian companies. The PBOC tried unpegging the yuan from the dollar in 2015. The yuan immediately plummeted. That indicated that the yuan was overvalued. If the yuan were undervalued, as Trump claims, it would have risen instead.

Source: The Balance

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Currency Wars: the Unloved Dollar Standard from Bretton Woods to the Rise of China

A yen for the unloved dollar standard

Tan Sri Andrew Sheng gives analyses the populist and expert views of how the yen measures against the “unloved US dollar standard”.

TRAVELLING around the South-East Asian region last week, the mood was all about currency fluctuation and impact on markets.

Things do look different when the Thai stock market daily turnover touches US$2bil and is higher than that of Singapore. But the headline that Thai growth slowed quarter-on-quarter but still grew 5.3% year-on-year gave rise to fears that export-driven economies in the region are beginning to slow.

The guru on the dollar relationship with the East Asian currencies has to be Stanford Professor Ronald I. McKinnon. McKinnon made his name with his first book, Money and Capital in Economic Development (1973), where he took forward the pioneering work of his Stanford colleague, Edward S. Shaw on the phenomenom of “financial repression” the use of negative real interest rates as a tax to finance development. His second book, The Order of Economic Liberalization: Financial Control in the Transition to a Market Economy (1993), was an influential textbook on how to get the sequencing of financial and trade reform right.

McKinnon's second area of expertise is the international currency order, explaining the macro-economics of the US dollar and its relationship with other currencies, particularly the yen and other East Asian currencies. The trouble was that his analysis did not “jive” with the populist policy view that “revaluing the other currency” would reduce the US trade deficit.

This began with the concern in the 1970s that the US-Japan trade imbalance was due to the cheap yen relative to the dollar. The Plaza Accord in 1985 was the political agreement to strengthen the yen and depreciate the dollar. From 1985 to 1990, the yen appreciated from 240 yen to 120 yen per dollar, followed by a huge bubble and two lost decades of growth.

In his important new book, McKinnon explains some uncomfortable truths with regard to what he called The Unloved Dollar Standard: From Bretton Woods to the Rise of China, Oxford University Press. The dollar standard is unloved because of what one US Treasury Secretary told his foreign critics of US exchange rate policy “our dollar, your problem”.

McKinnon argues that US monetary policy has been highly insular, despite globalisation making such insularity obsolete. He thinks that three macroeconomic fallacies were responsible the Phillips Curve Fallacy; the Efficient Market Fallacy and the Exchange Rate and Trade Balance Fallacy. In the 1960s, the US belief in the Phillips Curve that higher inflation generated lower unemployment resulted in the US pushing the Europeans and the Japanese to appreciate their currencies. When they refused, Nixon broke the link with gold in 1971.

In the Greenspan era (1987-2008), there was a strong belief in Efficient Markets, which encouraged global foreign exchange liberalisation, despite high volatility. But the most enduring fallacy is the belief that the exchange rate's role is to correct trade imbalance, hence the Japan bashing in the 1980s and the China bashing in the 21st century in order to push for their exchange rates to appreciate in order to reduce the US trade deficit.

McKinnon considers the third fallacy as the most pernicious conceptual barrier to a more internationalist and stable US monetary policy. Chapter 7, which is written by his student Helen Qiao, gives a robust argument why the third fallacy is wrong. She argues that while a depreciation of an insular economy with no net foreign liability may result in improved trade balance, it is not clear whether the depreciation of the dollar with a large net global liability is to the benefit of the United States.

In the case of Japan, a rising yen since the 1970s did not “cure” the Japanese trade surplus with the US. Between 2005 to 2007, when the yuan appreciated, the Sino-US trade surplus doubled. Qiao worries that China could follow Japan's steps into deflation and even a zero-interest rate liquidity trap if the yuan continues to appreciate.

The central thesis of this book is that the US should recognise that the dollar standard is actually a global standard, with many privileges and responsibilities. Depreciating the dollar is not to the US advantage, because it would only lead to future inflation. Instead, the US should concentrate on improving its competitiveness and manufacturing prowess. This requires having positive real interest rates.

The logic of the McKinnon thesis is irrefutable, although his American colleagues may find the conclusions somewhat unpalatable. The logic is that whoever maintains the dominant currency standard must maintain strong self-discipline, because the benchmark standard cannot be on shifting sands. If the dollar is weak because the US economy is weak, then all other currencies will be volatile, because they float around an unsteady standard.

For small open economies that maintain large trade with the US, having dollar pegs require them to keep their economies flexible and they must maintain fiscal and monetary discipline. This is the experience of the Hong Kong dollar peg.

Flexible exchange rates have not resulted in countries adjusting their overall competitiveness. What happened instead is that flexible exchange rates often allow governments to run “soft budget constraints” and try to depreciate their way out of the lack of competitiveness.

It is the refusal to make structural reforms that cause overall competitiveness to decline and these economies then go into a vicious circle of over-reliance on the exchange rate to keep the economy afloat. This is not sustainable, since if everyone tries to devalue their way out of trouble, rather than making structural adjustments, then the world will enter into a collective deflation.

The solution to this requires the US and China to work cooperatively at the monetary and exchange rate levels. This makes a lot of sense, which is why perhaps presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping are meeting soon to achieve rapport.

Anyone who wants to understand currency wars must read this book. It is an honest and frank appraisal of how we need common sense to get out of the current fragile state of global currency arrangements.

THINK ASIAN By TAN SRI ANDREW SHENG
■ Tan Sri Andrew Sheng is president of the Fung Global Institute.

The yuan goes global: Money talks and London is listening to the yuan

The Chinese currency is fast gaining weight worldwide and becoming a key topic of conversation for bankers.

THE fashionable youths in hot pants flocking to high-end department stores in London and bankers in dark suits walking in and out of skyscrapers in the financial district have one thing in common, a growing interest in the Chinese currency.

During the recent holiday to celebrate the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Elizabeth II, Harrods, a department store known for its ties with the British royal family, launched its own Sina Weibo, a popular Chinese social media platform, to attract more Chinese customers. Shoppers can find “the very latest, limited edition and exclusive products”, with Hermes, Chanel and Louis Vuitton among the most popular brands, according to the store’s spokesman.

More than 100 UnionPay payment terminals in the store also help to make Chinese shoppers feel more at home. Through the machines, part of China’s unified bank card network, Chinese visitors can pay for their purchases with the same cards they use at home.

Hear, hear: A man walking past the London Stock Exchange in London. London is now a yuan offshore trading centre, which will help both Chinese and European business people to avoid foreign exchange risks. — China Daily/Asia News Network

 

A few streets from Harrods, a billboard featuring a green jade dragon shaped like the yuan symbol stands outside a bank. The ad reads: “A new global currency is emerging. Be part of it.” The commercial is for HSBC, a bank rooted in the silk and tea trade between China and Britain in the 19th century.

The UnionPay terminals, the jade dragon advertisements and the shops on the streets of London offering exchange services between the British pound and the yuan are the tip of the iceberg in the biggest story in the financial markets today: the internationalisation of the Chinese currency.

As people search for a bright spot amid sluggish economic growth in the West, beset as it is by the European debt crisis, companies, investors and financial institutions are increasingly focused on the yuan. From Beijing to Hong Kong, Tokyo to London, policymakers and businesses are part of the push.

There are several forces driving this move, both at home and abroad. The People’s Bank of China has made several moves this year to liberalise the exchange rate; George Osborne, the UK chancellor of the exchequer, took the initiative to develop London into an offshore trading centre for the yuan earlier this year; and this month, the yuan became convertible with the Japanese yen under an agreement between the Chinese and Japanese governments.

“All of it demonstrates that the Chinese government is pushing forward the internationalisation of the yuan and encouraging the use of yuan offshore. That will help the global economy in many ways,” said Adam Tyrrell, head of European capital markets for Standard Chartered in London.

Greenback to redback

These initiatives will have a profound influence on the development of trade. For instance, China and Europe are each other’s largest trading partners, but, up till now, the bulk of that trade has been settled in the US dollar. If a Chinese company buys pork from a UK company, it does not buy and sell in yuan, the pound or the euro. It settles in dollars.

That paradox is changing. Now the same pork company can open a yuan account at a British bank such as HSBC or Standard Chartered, or a Chinese bank that operates in Europe, such as Bank of China or Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and can then invoice the goods or settle the deal with its Chinese clients in their national currency.

The advantage of this is clear: Settling in yuan helps both sides to avoid foreign exchange risks and reduces transaction costs. For instance, in 2008, many companies in southeast China had to lay off workers and close factories because they were losing money through currency appreciation.

That situation would have been different if the contracts had been signed in yuan, because the agreements would have a fixed value no matter what the change in the exchange rate.

The initiative can also benefit companies outside the European time zone, given London’s position as the world’s foreign exchange centre. “The beauty of London is not just about London,” said Patrick Law, Hong Kong-based managing director and head of trading for Greater China at Barclays. “If you look at the London time zone, it covers both the northern and southern hemispheres.” And that means it will also help facilitate business between China and Africa and the Middle East.

“Africa is a very interesting market to look into because China and Africa have a lot of business together,” Law said. He added that Barclays, a bank with strength in commodity trading, began to conduct trade between the South African rand and yuan from April.

Uncle Sam to dim sum

The internationalisation of the yuan will also offer a new platform for companies and investors looking for alternative methods of financing.

The “dim sum bond” got its name from delicacies in Chinese cuisine such as spring rolls, shrimp dumplings and steamed buns. The name has been appropriated for fixed income denominated in yuan and was started in Hong Kong when the city became the first offshore centre for yuan trading. The bond has become increasingly popular outside Asia and grew rapidly in Europe last year, according to Standard Chartered’s Tyrrell.

British banks were involved in five dim sum bond deals with European companies and financial institutions last year. It has also been involved in three client deals so far this year, according to Tyrrell: “Over time, as the yuan is used more, more European corporations and financial institutions will be interested in transacting in yuan, either for their China business, when they can remit onshore, or as a way of diversifying their investor base.”

The motivation for getting involved in dim sum bonds is also changing, he said. When the yuan market first developed offshore, a lot of investors were looking for a currency play rather than a bond play. At first, investors were looking to invest in the currency because they thought it was going to appreciate.

“Over time, it is developing into a more mature bond market,” said Tyrrell. “It will tend to be more driven by traditional bond market influences.”

Chances and problems

That’s particularly true this year, because of the fragile state of the global economy. If the investor sentiment is not there, there will be fewer bond issuances, according to Tyrrell. “There is definitely momentum in the yuan. It will not stop. It will grow,” he said.

Given the fact that the yuan is still not fully convertible, there is still a lot of work to be done to encourage people to hold it and conduct business with it, as they do with dollars.

The main issue for London as it attempts to develop into an offshore yuan trading centre revolves around the lack of liquidity. That’s due to both a paucity of knowledge about the yuan market and the limits of infrastructure to facilitate trade flows.

“Without liquidity, we cannot grow the pie and make the market more efficient,” Law said. “Everybody is definitely very interested. The current situation is that people have just started looking into it,” he said. “The involvement is still relatively small, but the amount of interest is actually very high.”

Some observers have suggested that the pool of yuan liquidity in London can grow through a huge variety of sources. For instance, Standard Chartered recently issued yuan-denominated European Commercial Paper to investors in Europe.

“ECP is issued to investors. Then Standard Chartered holds the liquidity in yuan and can use that for trade finance. This will help to increase trade flows with China for European clients,” Tyrrell said.

“As investors become more comfortable holding yuan, it will help build liquidity here.”

By Diao Ying, China Daily/Asia News Network

Demise of US dollar as world currency

Experts see demise of dollar as world currency

 By DORIS C DUMLAO and MICHELLE V. REMO

IT may only be a matter of time before the US dollar gets replaced as the main currency in international trade, according to economists attending the meeting of the board of governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in Manila.

Asian Development Bank, ADB

For many years, the dollar “has been almost the sole ‘reserve’ currency,” banked on by the world economy, American economist Jeffrey Sachs said on Thursday in one of the forums held during the ADB annual event. “Going forward, (the dollar) can’t play that role anymore.”

Sachs added that he could not see how the US dollar could remain as the world’s reserve currency when “the role of the United States in the global economy is diminishing.”

Several finance experts echoed Sachs’ sentiment, explaining that, with the greenback expected to weaken further, the world should turn to another currency to facilitate international trade and other commercial transactions.

“Having another reserve currency other than the US dollar is only a matter of time. We don’t know exactly when it will happen, but it will,” Neeraj Swaroop of Standard Chartered Bank said in an interview at the sidelines of the ADB meeting.

In the area of merchandise trading, Swaroop said, countries have actually started to use currencies other than the US dollar.

Sachs also said that some countries could turn to more than one currency in maintaining their foreign exchange reserves.

One currency being considered is the Chinese renminbi (RMB) which, according to HSBC, will inevitably become an international reserve currency.

The renminbi, or yuan, has the potential to become an international reserve currency because China is continuing to post strong growth, becoming an important player in the global economy, Iwan Azis, ADB head for regional integration, said in the same forum.

Also, China is pushing to make the yuan the world’s reserve currency – a move that is seen to hasten the replacement of the US dollar, Azis added.

Already, British banking giant HSBC has mapped out a strategy to be a leading global player in the “renminbi banking” space.

This global strategy has filtered into the Philippine market with the bank’s introduction of RMB-denominated deposit and trade financing facilities, top HSBC officials said in a press briefing on Thursday.

Spencer Lake of HSBC said the renminbi was increasingly becoming an important currency from a trade perspective.

Lake was in Manila as head of the HSBC delegation to the ADB event.

“If it were freely convertible today, it will be the second-largest currency in the world,” Lake said, noting that China has started to liberalise currency systems.

“It’s part of our core strategy to adopt and put in place all of the infrastructure and products to embrace (the renminbi) as a future reserve currency,” Lake said.

Lake said the bank’s strategy appeared to be gaining ground as indicated by a “significant” buildup of the RMB business in Hong Kong, Singapore and other South-East Asian countries.

“The world is getting ready to adopt it as a world currency,” he said. “You’ll see it as a more common language.”

“Reserve” currency, which is currently used to describe the US dollar, is the denomination that accounts for bulk of the foreign exchange reserves of most countries.

A country taps its foreign exchange reserves whenever it needs to pay off the costs of imported products and debts to foreign creditors.

After the United States fell into a recession in 2009, the US dollar began to weaken against emerging market currencies.

The trouble with hanging on to the dollar as the main reserve currency is that it is prone to depreciation given the prevailing economic troubles of the United States.

Depreciation of the US dollar, in turn, may lead to a reduction in the value of a country’s foreign reserves, experts said.

Apart from the yuan, Sachs said other viable currencies that could replace the US dollar were the euro and the Japanese yen. — Philippine Daily Inquirer / Asia News Network   

Currency War & Exchange Rates Tension!

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Tension over exchange rates

WHAT ARE WE TO DO By TAN SRI LIN SEE-YAN

Amid heightened fears over eurozone sovereign debt risks and increasing concerns about the health of the United States and eurozone economies, worried investors have flocked to the safety of haven currencies, especially the Swiss franc, and gold.

While investors and speculators have since moved aggressively to buy gold, the switch from being large sellers to buying by a number of emerging nation's central banks (Mexico, Russia, South Korea and Thailand) has helped propel the price of gold more than 25% higher this year, hitting a record US$1,920 a troy ounce earlier this month. At a time of high uncertainty in the face of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) latest gloomy forecast on global growth, few central banks relish the prospect of a flood of international cash pushing their currencies higher.

Massive over-valuation of their currencies poses an acute threat to their economic well-being, and carries the risk of deflation.

The Swiss franc

Switzerland's national currency, the CHF, should be used to speculative attacks by now. So much so in the 1970s, the Swiss National Bank (SNB) was forced to impose negative interest rates on foreign investors (who have to pay banks to accept their CHF deposits).

And, it has been true in recent years, with the CHF rising by 43% against the euro since the start of 2010 until mid-August this year. There does not seem to be an alternative to the CHF as a safe haven at the moment.

With what's going on in the United States, eurozone and Japan, investors have lost faith in the world's two other haven currencies: US dollar (USD) and the yen.

This reflects the Federal Reserves' ultra-loose policy stance and the political fiscal impasse in the United States which have scared away investments from the dollar. The prospect that Tokyo might once again intervene to limit the yen's strength has deterred speculators from betting on further gains from it. To be fair, the CHF has also benefitted from recent signs that the Swiss economy, thanks in large part to its close ties to a resurgent Germany, is thriving.

But enough is enough. SNB made a surprising announcement on Sept 6 that it would buy foreign currencies in “unlimited quantities” to combat a huge over-valuation of the CHF, and keep the franc-euro exchange rate above 1.20 with the “utmost determination.”

On Aug 9, the CHF reached a new record, touching near parity against the euro from 1.25 at the start of the year, while the USD sank to almost CHF 0.70 (from 0.93). The impact so far has been positive: the euro rose 8% on that day and the 1.20 franc level had since stabilised. It was a gamble.

Of course, SNB had intervened before in 2009 and 2010, but in a limited way at a time when the euro was far stronger. But this time, with the nation's economy buckling under the currency's massive over-valuation, the risks of doing nothing were far greater. In July last year, following a chequered history of frustrated attempts, SNB vowed it would not intervene again. By then, the central bank was already awash with foreign currency reserves. Worse, the CHF value of these reserves plunged as the currency strengthened. In 2010, SNB recorded a loss of CHF20 billion, and a further CHF10 billion in 1H'11. As a result, SNB came under severe political pressure for not paying the expected dividend. But exporters also demanded further intervention to stop the continuing appreciation.

This time, SNB is up against a stubborn euro-debt crisis which just won't go away. True, recent efforts have been credible. Indeed, the 1.20 francs looks defensible, even though the CHF remains over-valued. Fair value appears to be closer to 1.30-1.40. But inflation is low; still, the risk of asset-price bubbles remains. What's worrisome is SNB acted alone. For the European Central Bank (ECB), the danger lies in SNB's eventual purchases of higher quality German and French eurozone government bonds with the intervention receipts, countering the ECB's own intervention in the bond market to help weaker members of Europe's monetary union, including Italy and Spain.



This causes the spread between the yields of these bonds to widen, and pile on further pressure on peripheral economies. Furthermore, unlimited Swiss buying of euro would push up its value, adding to deflationary pressures in the region.

The devil's trade-off

As I see it, the Swiss really has no other options. SNB has been attempting to drive down the CHF by intervening in the money markets but with little lasting effect. “The current massive over-valuation of the CHF poses an acute threat to the Swiss economy,” where exports accounted for 35% of its gross domestic product. The new policy would help exports and help job security. As of now, there is no support from Europe to drive the euro higher.

SNB is caught in the “devil's trade-off,” having to choose risking its balance sheet rather than risk “mounting unemployment, deflation and economic damage.” The move is bound to cause distortions and tension over exchange rates globally.

New haven: the Nokkie'

SNB's new policy stance has sent ripples through currency markets. In Europe, it drove the Norwegian krone (Nokkie) to an eight-year high against the euro as investors sought out alternative safe havens. Since money funds must have a minimum exposure in Europe and, with most European currencies discredited and quality bonds yielding next to nothing, the Nokkie became a principal beneficiary. It offers 3% return for three-month money-market holdings.

Elsewhere, the Swedish krona also gained ground, rising to its strongest level against the euro since June after its central bank left its key interest rates unchanged, while signalling that the rate will only creep up. What's worrisome is that if there is continuing upward pressure on the Nokkie or the krona, their central banks would act, if needed with taxes and exchange controls. With interest rates at or near zero and fiscal policy exhausted or ruled out politically in the most advanced nations, currencies remain one of the only policy tools left.

At a time of high uncertainty, investors are looking for havens. Apart from gold and some real assets, few countries would welcome fresh inflows which can stir to over-value currencies. Like it or not, speculative capital will still find China and Indonesia particularly attractive.

Yen resists the pressure 

SNB's placement of a “cap” to weaken the CHF has encouraged risk-adverse investors who sought comfort in the franc to turn to the yen instead. So far, the yen has stayed below its record high reached in mid-August. But it remains well above the exporters' comfort level.

Indeed, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) has signalled its readiness to ease policy to help as global growth falters. But so far, the authorities are happy just monitoring and indications are they will resist pressure to be as bold as the Swiss, for three main reasons: (i) unlike to CHF, the yen is not deemed to be particularly strong at this time it's roughly in line with its 30-year average; (ii) unlike SNB, Japan is expected to respect the G-7's commitment to market determined exchange rates; and (iii) Japan's economy is five times the size of Switzerland and the yen trading volume makes defending a pre-set rate in the global markets well-nigh impractical.

Still, they have done so on three occasions over the past 12 months: a record 4.51 trillion yen sell-off on Aug 9 (surpassing the previous daily record of 2.13 trillion yen from Sept 2010).

The operation briefly pushed the USD to 80.25 yen (from 77.1 yen) but the effects quickly waned and the dollar fell back to a record low of 75.9 yen on Aug 19. But, I gather the Finance Ministry needs to meet three conditions for intervention: (a) the yen/USD rate has to be volatile; (b) a simultaneous easing by BoJ; and (c) intervention restricted to one day only.

Given these constraints, it is no wonder MOF has failed to arrest the yen's underlying trend. In the end, I think the Japanese has learnt to live with it unlike the Swiss who has the motivation and means to resist a strong currency.

Reprieve for the yuan 

I sense one of the first casualties of the failing global economic expansion is renewed pressure to further appreciate the yuan. For China, August was a good month to adjust strong exports, high inflation and intense international pressure. As a result, the yuan appreciated against the USD by more than 11%, up from an average of about 5% in the first seven months of the year. However, the surge had begun to fade in the first half of September.

But with the United States and eurozone economic outlook teetering in gloom, China's latest manufacturing performance had also weakened, reflecting falling overseas demand.

This makes imposing additional currency pressure on exporters a no-go. Meanwhile, inflation has stabilised. Crude oil and imported food prices have declined, reducing inflationary pressure and the incentive to further appreciate the yuan. Looks like September provided a period of some relief. But, make no mistake, the pressure is still there. The fading global recovery may have papered over the cracks. Pressure won't grind to a halt.

Central banks instinctively try to ward-off massive capital flows appreciating their currencies. There are similarities between what's happening today, highlighted by the recent defensive move by SNB, and the tension over exchange rates at last year-end. It's an exercise in pushing the problem next door.

This can be viewed as a consequence of recent Japanese action (Tokyo's repeated intervention to sell yen). It threatens to start a chain of responses where every central bank tries to weaken its currency in the face of poor global economic prospects and growing uncertainty. So far, the tension has not risen to anything like last year's level. But with rising political pressure provoking resistance to currency appreciation, the potential for a fresh outbreak remains real. The Brazilian Finance Minister just repeated his warning last year that continuing loose US monetary policies could stoke a currency war.

Growing stress

With the euro under growing stress from sovereign debt problems, the market's focus is turning back to Japan (prompting a new plan to deal with a strong yen), to non-eurozone nations (Norway, Denmark, Sweden and possibly the United Kingdom) and on to Asia (already the ringgit, rupiah, baht and won are coming under pressure on concerns over uncertainty and capital flight). Similarly, Brazil's recent actions to limit currency appreciation highlights the dilemma faced by fast growing economies (Turkey, Chile and Russia) since allowing currency appreciation limits domestic overheating but also undermines competitiveness.

This low level currency war between emerging and advanced economies had further unsettled financial markets.

Given the weak economic outlook, most governments would prefer to see their currencies weaken to help exports. The risk, as in the 1930s, is not just “beggar-thy-neighbour” devaluations but resort to a wide range of trade barriers as well. Globally co-ordinated policies under G-20 are preferred. But that's easier said than done.

So, it is timely for the IMF's September “World Economic Outlook” to warn of “severe repercussions” to the global economy as the United States and eurozone could face recession and a “lost decade” of growth (a replay of Japan in the 90s) unless nations revamped economic policies. For the United States, this means less reliance on debt and putting its fiscal house in order.

For the eurozone, firm resolution of the debt crisis, including strengthening its banking system. For China, increased reliance on domestic demand. And, for Brazil, cooling an over-heating economy. This weekend, the G-20 is expected to take-up global efforts to rebalance the world overwhelmed by heightened risks to growth and the deepening debt crisis. Focus is expected on the role of exchange rates in rebalancing growth, piling more pressure on China's yuan.

Frankly, IMF meetings and G-20 gatherings don't have a track record of getting things done. I don't expect anything different this time. The outlook just doesn't look good.

Former banker, Dr Lin is a Harvard educated economist and a British Chartered Scientist who now spends time writing, teaching and promoting public interest. Feedback is most welcome; email: starbizweek@thestar.com.my.