A military pivot to Asia
         By TANG SIEW MUN
‘Pivoting to Asia’ is fast becoming the centrepiece of US strategic and diplomatic objectives.
IF there were doubts about America’s “return” to Asia, all were  dissipated with the release of the new strategic guidance report by the  Pentagon on Jan 5.
Washington’s grand objective can be gleaned  from the title of the report, “Sustaining US Global Leadership:  Priorities for 21st Century Defence”.
While the report affirms US  interests worldwide and renews its pledge to uphold its commitments to  its allies and friends, it unambiguously stresses the importance of  Asia. It states that the US “will of necessity rebalance towards the  
Asia-Pacific region”.
The report follows through the grand  strategic vision enunciated by 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in an  article published in 
Foreign Policy where she declared that “the  future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and  the United States will be right at the centre of the action”.
“Pivoting to Asia” is fast becoming the centrepiece of US strategic and diplomatic objectives.
Before  “pivoting” became the cornerstone of the US-Asia policy, the region was  abuzz with the US “return” to Asia. China, understandably, was  especially agitated.
Indeed, there are segments in China who view  the US “return” to Asia with a sense of foreboding, as US initiatives  are seen as stratagems to contain China’s growing influence and power in  the region.
If hitherto there were concerns about the US return  to Asia, then Washington’s “pivot movement” to Asia will certainly  generate more discussion and potentially countervailing measures.
To  be sure, “pivoting” is different from “returning”. In general, a US  return would be marked by its heightened diplomatic engagement,  especially with its newfound interest and support for multilateral  initiatives such as the 
East Asia Summit.
A US “return” to Asia  would be largely viewed by South-East Asia as a positive development,  especially in an uncertain strategic environment punctuated by China’s  expanding economic and military power.
In this regard, the US is  seen as a reliable and indispensable power to balance and, if necessary,  to check Chinese aggressive designs.
However, pivoting in the context of the Pentagon report may see an increased 
US military presence in the region.
South-East  Asia is no stranger to the US military. Up until November 1991 when the  Clark Air Base was returned to the Philippines, the US had maintained a  large military footprint in the region.
The US has close  relations with its treaty partners Thailand and the Philippines. In  November 1990, the US negotiated an arrangement with Singapore that gave  it access to and use of facilities in the city state.
Singapore  is also home to the US Navy’s Logistics Group Western Pacific that  provides logistics support for the 
US Seventh Fleet.
For many  decades, the US had consistently maintained a high strategic profile  through bilateral and multilateral military exercises and other  military-to-military cooperation.
The hubs-and-spokes system of  bilateral security treaties, which includes South Korea, Japan and  Australia, has long been regarded as the backbone of the region’s  security.
The strategic presence of the US in, and its engagement  with, the region is often quoted as one of the primary reasons for  South-East Asia’s stability and growth.
The argument goes that  the US provided the security umbrella which allowed 
South-East Asian  states to limit their defence outlays.
This argument was  certainly valid during the 
Cold War era when the Asean states were  undoubtedly pro-American and cooperated to varying degrees with the US.
In  fact, when the US Air Force pulled out of the Clark Air Base, there was  a sense of trepidation and the perception that the US was withdrawing  from the region.
There was genuine fear about a power vacuum  which would “invite” other major powers to supplant the US’ dominant  role in regional security.
Fortunately, these fears were  unfounded as the expected jostling for primacy in Asia and the feared US  retreat did not materialise.
While the US’ diplomatic and  political “return” to the region is applauded and welcomed, reception  for its “pivot to Asia” may be less enthusiastic.
There are  several reasons for such pessimism. Granted that the pivot strategy will  be multifaceted and not uni-dimensionally focusing on military power.
However, it is the latter component of the pivot strategy that may prove to be most controversial.
To  the extent that pivoting entails an enlarged and more visible military  footprint, it will be destabilising and anathema to regional security.
An  increased US military profile will generate what academics understand  as a “security dilemma” and make China feel uncomfortable, to put it  mildly.
A case in point is the recent announcement of the  deployment up to 2,500 US Marines on a “rotational” basis in Darwin,  Australia.
Washington and Canberra were quick to emphasise the  transient nature of the deployment, but whichever way one attempts to  slice and dice “Darwin”, in the eyes of the Chinese and the rest of  South-East Asia, this move puts hundreds of well-trained and highly  mobile US military personnel at the edge of the region.
It is a potential “beach head” for the US to organise and launch military expeditions into South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.
We can also expect to see more of the Stars and Stripes in the region.
Last  month, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert wrote in the  US Naval Institute’s Proceedings that the US is contemplating deploying  littoral combat ships in Singapore and “other places” in South-East  Asia.
We must ask ourselves whether there is an imminent threat in the region that necessitates increased fire power from the US.
There  is a point beyond which an increased military presence provides a  negative marginal return. More is not always necessarily better.
There  may be quarters in South-East Asia that embrace a larger US military  role and profile. Notable among these are the “hedgers” who no doubt see  the US as the ultimate “insurance policy” to guard against strategic  uncertainty.
When it is diplomatically untenable and militarily  impractical to balance against China’s expanding military might, then  the growing presence of the US is reassuring, to say the least.
It cannot be denied that the 
People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) growing muscle is being closely monitored and analysed.
While there is no unified response to this phenomenon, it is accepted that South-East Asia cannot match the PLA gun for gun.
A  military response is destructive and ultimately futile. The preferred  modality is to embed China in a web of regional and multilateral  cooperation mechanisms.
The Asean China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) and the Asean Plus Three (APT) are but two examples.
South-East  Asia should stay the course and continue its ongoing successful  engagement of China. However, the military component of “pivoting” may  serve to amplify the strategic divide and suspicions between China and  South-East Asia.
The implications of “pivoting” are multiple. For a start, the US will seek a larger voice and role in the region.
Secretary  Clinton spoke for many Americans when she asserted that Asia is the  future and correspondingly the US must be in Asia.
The substantive question that needs to be asked is, “When the US leads, should Asia fall in line and accept US leadership?”
It  would be unrealistic for Washington to assume that Asia will do this.  Acceptance of US leadership is not universal, nor is it automatic.
Support  for the US in Indonesia, South-East Asia’s largest country, is  slipping. The Pew Global Attitudes Survey showed it has declined from  56% in 2009 to 49% in 2010.
Asia does not dance to the tune of Washington, nor does it march to the beat of the Chinese.
While  Washington sees its future in Asia, it needs to be mindful that the  success of its “pivot” strategy is contingent on the concurrence and  support of Asia.
The operative words are cooperation and collaboration.
The  region’s strategic uncertainty – read as fear of China – cannot be  resolved by the placement of more US troops in the region or through  military grandstanding.
It is not about being pro-US or  anti-China but how to build a stable, secure and prosperous future. The  US pivot to Asia should be welcomed to the extent that it contributes  constructively to a better and brighter future for Asia.
>  The writer is Director (Foreign Policy and Security Studies) at the  Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia. The  views are his own.Obama's New Defense Strategy:  Poke a Stick In China's Eye And See What Happens This new "Defense Strategy" of President Obama's is a deliberate provocation of the Chinese, as was his trip to Asia last month when he made his none too cute "We're Back" declaration.  
Last Month in Australia Obama was quoted as saying, “Let there be no doubt: in the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century, the United States of America is all in.” 
If there was doubt in anyone's mind in Beijing, about American intentions Obama dispelled that doubt and any room for reasoned diplomacy by elaborating that this is a “deliberate and strategic decision” America is “here to stay”.    What an affront to the Chinese!  We were hoping the State Department would let this new offensive go quietly away.   Unfortunately, that is not to be.  Obama's "Strategy" is a dangerous road to take.  If it is intended to assist him in his re election efforts it will seriously backfire.  Unfortunately, the consequence won't be just Obama's and the Democrat Party.  The outcome of this foreign policy fiasco  will fall squarely on the shoulders of America and it's allies.  This new policy is literal insanity. It would appear Obama is playing right into the hands of Hu Jintao and the Chinese military leaders who are just chomping at the bit for a fight.    An Article in the Economist in  a much more nuanced and cautious fashion discusses the concerns many  other's have about the manner in which Obama is flexing his muscles and  apparently bullying for a fight with the Chinese.   
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China hasn't issued a stamp with this ferocious a dragon  since 1878 (Photo Xinhua) | 
This  is the year of the dragon and they must be deft dumb and blind over in  foggy bottom to have missed the significance the Chinese attribute to  this auspicious event.  The dragon was a symbol of  China's Imperial  Power and today it is a not too subtle symbol of China's Military,  Political and Economic power.  That China chose to reissue such a ferocious stamp this year is no coincidence.
We have  to ask ourselves why has Obama picked this time to insult and bully a  world power that is vastly superior to our own, certainly in it's own  backyard.  Does anyone think the Chinese are going to stand idly by as  Obama in his arrogance, asserts his "right" to "ensure China's peaceful rise to power".     The implied threat in that statement from Obama and the Clinton State  Department is palpable.  The US, in the person of Obama, is saying,  "We're going to come into China's sphere of influence 
and arbitrate and adjudicate any and all issues we decide have a  national security interest to us."  Certainly, the United States should  not cede it's position as a world power and it's interests but to do so  in such an ignorant and arrogant fashion is inexcusable. 
A bizarre thought  occurs to us that given Obama's own love of Socialism and Marxism maybe  his provocation of China is intended to give Hu and General Lin Yuan, (A possible successor to Hu) an excuse and license to go to war with America. Posted by FarmerRickyRelated post: